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RECENT CASES
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS-INsoLVENcY-RIGHTS
AND
TIES OF BORROWING STOCKHOLDERS-A stockholder of a building

LIABILI-

and loan
association borrowed money therefrom and had made a number of payments by
way of dues, interest and premium,' when the association was declared insolvent. In a suit by the association to recover the amount of the loan, the
defendant stockholder contended that he should be allowed to set-off all the
money he had paid in to the association. Held, that he is entitled to be credited on the loan with the amount of premium and interest paid, but not for
payments made as dues. R. C. Clenent Building Association v. Ortens, II D.
& C. 215 (Pa. 1928).

It is uniformly held that a borrowing stockholder occupies a dual relationship to a solvent building and loan association, namely, that of borrower
and stockholder.' Nevertheless, three views have been advanced in regard to
the rights and obligations of such stockholders when the association becomes
insolvent. They are often referred to as the Maryland, Pennsylvania and Illinois rules? Under the Maryland rule, as opposed to the principal case, the
borrowing stockholder is credited on the loan with all paymentq made, whether
by way of dues, interest or premium. This view is based upon the theory
that the insolvency of the association severs the pre-existing dual relationship,
since the association can no longer carry out its membership contract? It
naturally follows, therefore, since only a contract of loan remains, that all
moneys paid to the association must be credited to the loan.' The Pennsylvania
'A premium is an amount in addition to the agreed rate of interest, and
which when added to that rate usually totals an amount in excess of the legal
rate, which a member bids, and agrees to pay, for priority in obtaining a loan
or advance in preference to other members, who also desire a loan or advance, when there is not enough money in the treasury to accommodate all.
SUNDHEIm, LAW OF BUILDING AND LOAN ASSoCIATIONS (2d ed. 1922) 132.
Preston v. Woodland, io4 Md. 642, 65 Atl. 336 (i9o6) ; Leechburg B.
and L. Ass'n v. Kinter, 233 Pa. 354, 82 At. 498 (ipii) ; Barry v. Downs,
87 Ill. App. 486 (i0oo). As a stockholder, he is a member, and in theory
at least participates in the management of the association, and in that capacity
shares in the expenses of the business, the losses and the profits, as would a
stockholder of any other corporation. As a borrower, the member simply
receives an advance on the par value of his stock, agreeing to pay the legal
interest during the time he has the money of the association, with the expectation that his stock will reach par value or mature about the time fixed for
the payment of the loan. Mercantile Co-op. Bank v. Goodspeed, 68 N. J. Eq.
395, 59 Atl. 802 (899).
' SUNDHEIIM, op. cit. supra note I, 127; Groover v. Pacific Coast Savings
Society et al., 164 Cal. 67, 127 Pac. 495 (1912).
'Flinn

v. Interstate B. and L. Ass'n, 141 Fed. 672 (C. C. S. C. 1905)

(construing a South Carolina contract) ; Preston v. Woodland. supra note 2;
Cooke v. Kent, 105 Mass. 246 (I87O).
Preston v. Woodland, supra note 2; Williams v. Maxwell,

123 N. C.
586, 31 S. E. 821 (1898); Carpenter v. Lewis, 65 S. C. 400, 43 S. E. 88i

(i9o3) ; Snyder v. Fidelity Savings Ass'n, 23 Utah 291, 64 Pac. 870 (1901).
'Waverly Mutual etc., Ass'n v. Buck, 64 Mo. 338, i At. 56i (1885);
City Loan etc., Ass'n v. Goodrich, 48 Ga. 445 (1873) ; Meares v. Finlayson,

(534)
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rule, which, of course, the principal case follows, is based upon the theory
that insolvency does not sever the pre-existing dual relationship, and therefore
what the borrower has paid as dues he has paid as a stockholder, and what he
has paid as interest and premium he has paid as a borrower 8 The Illinois rule
differs from the Pennsylvania rule only in that instead of crediting the stockholder with the whole premium it credits him with only that part estimated
as unearned.0 The Maryland rule is said to be that of the earlier cases," and
has been severely criticized because it ignores the rights and equities of the
non-borrower, who is made to bear the burden of all losses.'1 The Pennsylvania and Illinois rules are said to be that of the more recent and better
considered cases.' However, the Pennsylvania rule has also been criticized,
because it credits the borrower with the whole premium and ignores the fact
that the borrower has had the advantage of the loan for a part of the time,
during which dividends have been declared and stock has matured out of the
association's earnings, of which premiums were a great part. Since the Illinois rule only credits the unearned premium, it seems to most nearly serve
the ends of justice.
CONSPIRACY-CONSTRUCTION or FEDERAL STATUTE PUNISHING CONSPIRACY
70 COMMIT AN OFFENSE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES-In violation of a fed-

eral civil statute,' which provides a penalty for each infraction thereof, the
63 S. C. 537, 41 S. E. 779 (1902). Of course, this method is also followed
in those jurisdictions which regard stock' payments of a borrowing member
as a fiction, and therefore do not recognize the dual relationship at all. SUNDHEm, op. cit. supra note 1. 128.
'Strohen v. Franklin Saving Fund and Loan Ass'n, 115 Pa. 273, 8 Atl.
843 .(I886); Cooper v. Newton, 16o Fed. igo (C. C. S. D. Ga. 19o8); Hae
v. Phillips, 68 Ark. 382, 59 S.W. 35 (igoi) ; Groover v. Pacific Coast Savings
Society, supra note 4; Rogers v. Rains, 100 Ky. 295, 38 S.W. 483 (1896).
'People's B. and L. Ass'n v. McPhilamy, 81 Miss. 61, 32 So. iooi (i9o2).
There is no splitting of premiums under this rule into earned and unearned
portions, the theory being that the consideration for the premium wholly fails
on the termination of the association and that there is no equity in its apportionment. Ottensoser v. Scott, 47 Fla. 276, 37 So. I6I (i9o4).
'MacMurray v. Gosney, io6 Fed. ii (C. C. W. D. Pa. igoi); Dooling v.
Davis, 89 Ill.
App. 485 (x9oo); Sullivan v. Spaniol, 78 Ill.
App. 125 (1898);
Ferrel v. Evans, 25 Mont. 444, 65 Pac. 714 (igoi). For the period that the
borrower has had the money until ,the association becomes insolvent the premium has been earned. It is true that the borrower might not have bid the
premium if he had foreseen the premature death of the association; but neither
would his fellow stockholders, with a like foreknowledge, have contributed
their installments. The misfortune of the one is not greater than that of the
other. Towle v. American B. and L. Society, 6I Fed. 446 (C. C. N. D. Il.
1894).
Groover v. Pacific Coast Savings Society et al., supra note 4.
People's B. and L. Ass'n v. McPhilamy, supra note 8.
Ibid.
'z SUNDHEim,
op. cit. supra note f, 129. Towle v. American B. and L.
Society, supra note 9,at 448.
143 STAT. 1268 (1925), 35 U. S. C. § 50 (1926): "Every person, who
in any manner marks upon anything made, used, or sold by him for which he
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defendants manufactured a certain tire gauge which had been patented by X,
and counterfeited X's patent marks thereon. For conspiring to so manufacture and counterfeit the defendants were indicted under § 37 of the Criminal
Code' of the United States, which makes it a punishable crime for "two or
more persons to conspire to commit any offense against the United States,
or to defraud the United States in any manner or for any purpose . . . "
Held, that the defendants were guilty of conspiring to commit an offense
against the United States. United States v. Winner et al., 28 F. (2d) 295
(N. D. Ill.1928).
At early common law persons conspiring to do an act were not criminally liable unless that act would be a crime, per se.' But later decisions held
a group of persons guilty if they conspired to do acts which if done by a single individual would not have been criminally actionable.4 However, the instant case presents a somewhat different problem since there are no common
law crimes against the United States,' and accordingly, there must be a violation of a federal statute for an offense to come within the conspiracy clause of
the Criminal Code.6 By construing this conspiracy clause strictly,- the early
crime' to be guilty thereunder, and that a conspiracy to violate a civil statute'
was not sufficient to make them criminally indictable. But just as the common
has not obtained a patent, the name or imitation of the name of the person
courts held it to mean that the defendants must conspire to commit a statutory
who has obtained a patent therefor without the consent of such patentee . . .
or who . . . marks upon . . . such patented article the word 'patent' or
'patentee' . . . with intent to . . . counterfeit the mark . . . of the patentee

. . . for the purpose of deceiving the public, shall be liable, for every such
offense, to a penalty of not less than $ioo, with costs; one-half of said penalty to the person who shall sue for the same, and the other half to the use
of the United States . . . "
235 STAT. io96 (igo), 18 U. S. C. § 88 (1926). This statute was first
enacted on March 2, 1867, in practically the same form as it is today: 14
STAT. 481 (1867). It was later embodied in the UNITED STATES STATUTES OF
1879: 21 STAT. 4 (1879).
'See Eaton, Conspiracy to Commit Acts Not Criminal Per Se (19o6) 6
CoL L. R-v. 215; State v. Hickling, 41 N. J. L. 2o8, 209-210 (1879).
'State v. Younger & Cook, 12 N. C. 357 (827) ; Commonwealth v. M'Kisson, 8 S.& R. 42o (Pa. 1822) ; State v. Stewart, 59 Vt. 273, 9 At. 559 (1887).
But see State v. Eastern Coal Co., 29 R. I. 254, 257, 7o Atl. I, 3 (i9o8).
'United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32 (U. S.1812) ; see State v. Wheeling Bridge Co., i3How. 518, 563 (U. S. 1851); WRIGHT, CONSPIRACY (Am.
ed. 1887) 130.

'See

Heike v. United States,

192

Fed. 83, 91 (N. Y. i91) ; United

States v. Haas, 163 Fed. 9o8, 9io (C. C. N. Y. i9o8).
'People v. Hislop, 77 N. Y. 331 (879) ; I WHARTON, CRI.IMINAL LAW

(ioth ed. 1896) §25; see United States v. Robbins, 157 Fed. 999, IOOO (Utah
1907).

United States v. Watson, 17 Fed. 145 (N. D. Miss. 1883) ; It re Wolf,
Fed. 6o6 (W. D. Ark. 1886). Some later decisions still adhere to this
construction of the statute. United States v. Thomas, 145 Fed. 74 (Mo.
19o6) ; see Radin v. United States, 189 Fed. 568, 571 (N. Y. 1911).
"United States v. Payne, 22 Fed. 426 (Kan. 1884) (penalty provided for
violation of this civil statute).
27
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law courts widened the scope of actionability in conspiracy,' so the recent
tendency of the federal courts has been to accomplish the same result by a
more liberal constructon of the conspiracy statute. Thus these courts have
held conspiracy to violate civil statutes to come within its provisions," especially where those statutes provide penalties for their violation.Y Moreover,
a number of cases have held that conspiracy to do acts defrauding the United
States come within the meaning of the Criminal Code, even though they are
not statutory crimes," and there is no pecuniary loss to the United States. '
One court has gone so far as to hold that conspiracy to do an act which would
be a crime at common law, although not one by federal statute, is punishable
under the Code.' The court in the principal case proceeded on the theory that
the penalty clause of the patent statute was provided to protect an interest of
the public, 6 and therefore a violation of it must be an offense against the
United States on the grounds of public policy. While this theory necessitates
a rather broad construction of the conspiracy statute, it is supported by the
most recent decisons on the point. 7

"Supra note 4.
'United States v. Hutto, 256 U. S. 524, 41 Sup. Ct. 54I (921) ; Beshind
v. United States, 281 Fed. 47 (C. C. A. 6th, 1922); WRIGHT, op. cit. supra
note 5,at I;
see Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197, 203, 13 Sup. Ct.
542, 545 (1893). Likewise a conspiracy to violate the injunction of a court of
equity was held sufficient offense to come within the statute. Taylor v. United
States, 2 F. (2d) 444 (C. C. A. 7th, 1924) ; Wilder v. United States, 143 Fed.
433 (C. C. A. 4th, i9o6) (interference with proceedings in a civil suit).
Where statutes have changed the word "unlawful" to "misdemeanor" and
set no punishment for such act, conspiracy to do the same was held to fall
under the criminal statute. United States v. Stevenson, 215 U. S. 200, 30
Sup. Ct. 37 (i9o9); United States v. Tsohas, 163 Fed. 129 (C. C. S. D.
N. Y. 19o8). It is interesting to note that if the defendants conspire to commit a crime, the punishment for which is less than that provided by the conspiracy statute, they are liable to the greater punishment. Clune v. United
States, I59 U. S. 59o, 16 Sup. Ct. 125 (I895); Thomas v. United States,
156 Fed. 897 (C. C. A. 8th, i9o7).
"United States v. Hutto, and United States v. Stevenson, both stupra
note II.
"United States v. Stone, 135 Fed. 392 (N. J. i9o5); Haas v. Henkel,
166 Fed. 621 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. i9og), affd, 216 U. S. 462, 30 Sup. Ct. 249
(igo9); United States v. Raley, 173 Fed. 159 (Ore. igo9).
" United States v. Lonabaugh, I58 Fed. 314 (Wyo. 1907); Hammerschmidt v. United States, 287 Fed. 817 (C. C. A. 6th, z923) ; Haas v. Henkel,
supra note 13.
"United States v. Galleanni, 245 Fed. 977 (Mass. 1917).
"The primary purpose of the patent laws is to benefit the public by promoting the progress of science and useful arts. See Motion Picture Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502, 511, 37 Sup. Ct. 416, 418 (1917).
"'A conspiracy to commit any offense which by act of Congress is prohibited in the interest of the public policy of the United States, although not
of itself punishable by criminal prosecution, but only by suit for a penalty,
is a conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States within the
meaning of § 37." United States v. Hutto, supra note II, at 529, 41 Sup. Ct.
at 543; quoted in Beshind v. United States, supra note ii, at 5r.
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CONSPIRACY-ORDERING LIQuoR DELIVERED AS CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE THE
NATIONAL PROHIBITION AcT-Kerper, a bootlegger in Philadelphia, during a

period of more than a year, made twelve shipments of intoxicating liquor
by prepaid express addressed to Norris, a banker who resided in New York.
These shipments, in the names of false consignors and under falsified descriptions of contents, were made to fill orders given by Norris to Kerper over the
telephone. Payment was made from time to time by cash or check. Norris
purchased the liquor solely for the use of himself and his guests. Norris and
Kerper were named as defendants in an indictment charging them, inter alia,
with conspiring to transport liquor in violation of the National ProhibitionAct.
Kerper pleaded guilty and Norris entered a plea of nolo contendere. On an
agreed stipulation of facts, held, that a conviction may be had of a buyer and
seller of liquor for conspiracy to transport liquor in a case where the agreement is that delivery of the liquor sold is to be effected by transportation from
the seller to the buyer; and that an order by a purchaser to a bootlegger located
at a distance, to deliver liquor, followed by transportation, delivery, and payment, is sufficient evidence of such an agreement. U. S. v. Joel D. Kerper and
Alfred E. Norris, U. S. E. D. Pa., decided Dec. 27, 1928.
The elements of the crime of conspiracy are an object to be accomplished,
which in this case must be the commission of an offense against the United
States, an agreement, understanding, or confederation between two or more
persons to co-operate for the accomplishment of the object, and under the federal statute,' an overt act by one or more of the conspirators to effect the object.2 The mere purchase of intoxicating liquor is not an offense under the
National Prohibition Act 3 Nor is the purchaser guilty of aiding and abetting
the sale.' The court agreed with these propositions and further assumed,
without deciding, that where there is nothing more than a simple sale, the
purchaser cannot be convicted of conspiring with the seller to make the sale 5
In such a case the agreement of the parties would be an essential element in
the sale and would not constitute a conspiracy under the rule that there is no
§ 37, 44

465 (1879) ; I8 U. S. C.
1923) "It is confederation that constitutes the crime at common law; our statute adds an overt
act, whether as an ingredient of crime or as a condition precedent to indictment is a mere piece of metaphysics." See also Hyde v. U. S., 225 U. S. 347,
357, 32 Sup. Ct. 793, 798 (1912) ; Joplin Mercantile Co. v. U. S., 236 U. S.
531, 2535, 35 Sup. Ct. 291, 292 (1915).
'UNITED

STATES CRIMINAL CODZ,

STAT.

§ 88. Vannata v. U. S., 289 Fed. 424, 426 (C. C. A. 2d,

854
3d,

Lucadomo v. U. S., 280 Fed. 653, 656 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922).
'U. S. CONSTITUTION, i8th Amend. NATIONAL PROmRITioN ACT, 44 STAT.
(1919), 27 U. S. C. § 12. Singer v. U. S., 278 Fed. 415, 419 (C. C. A.

1922)

(a purchaser is not a participant in the offense either as a principal

or an accessory; Vannata v. U. S., supra note I, 428; Dickerson v. U. S., I8
F. (2d) 887, 894 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927). Nor is a purchaser an accomplice;
De Long v. U. S., 4 F. (2d) 244 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925).
'State v. Tehan, 5o Conn. 92 (1882) ; Lott v. U. S., 205 Fed. 28 (C. C. A.
9th, r913) holding that the part played by a buyer is not unlawful solicitation
of or an unlawful inciting of the principal offense.
5
U. S. v. Katz, 271 U. S. 354, 46 Sup. Ct. 513 (1926) (dicta that such
an indictment would be of doubtful validity). But see Vannata v. U. S., supra
note I; Singer v. U. S., supra note 3, 419.

RECENT CASES
conspiracy in that class of crimes which cannot be committed except by the'
This rule invoked as a defense in this prosecuagreement of two parties
tion was held not to apply for the reason that no agreement or plurality-of
agents is necesary for the substantive crime of transportation-one person
alone may be guilty; and that although a sale of contraband requires an actual
delivery for its completion it does not necessarily involve transportation. That
there is here an element which does not necessarily involve a plurality of agents
for its commission, and although a person who does not or even cannot com.mit a substantive offense may be convicted of conspiring with another to commit
8
the offense, it is somewhat difficult to separate the delivery (transportation)
contemplated as a part of this particular transaction from the "sale" itself,
9
which is indicated to be beyond the reach of a conspiracy charge, merely because there may be sales of liquor made in which transportation is not involved. But considering that the transportation is here "an ingredient in addition to the sale" " there is a further question, how much must a person co'
Is a mere telephone request to deliver intoxioperate to be a conspirator?
cating liquor sufficient co-operation to make the person calling a conspirator
to transport? The mere knowledge of a crime about to be committed by another does not make the inactive party a conspirator," nor will knowledge
3
coupled with passive acquiescence, and the court indicated that possibly ex1
press approval and encouragement would not. ' There is required then, some
degree of participation in the confederation or agreement, which, however,
As for instance in
"WHARTON, CmIaINAL LAW (ixth ed. 1912) § 16o2.
the case of dueling, where the concert of action alleged to be a conspiracy to
duel is necessary to commit and complete the substantive offense.
The court gave two hypothetical situations: one where the bootlegger
without any previous understanding or even knowledge on the part of the
other party might bring the liquor to the customer's house, sell it, and leave
it; and where there is a sale of liquor together. with the premises on which
it is stored, followed by seller's moving out and the purchaser's moving in.
It was said in U. S. v. Katz, supra note 5, that the rule could be avoided "only
if the buyer and seller were charged -with conspiring to commit a substantive
offense having an ingredient to the sale not requiring the agreement of two
persons for its completion."
'U. S. v. Holte, 236 U. S. 140, 35 Sup. Ct. 271 (i915).
'tSupra note 5 and assumption of court.
0U. S. v. Katz, supra note 7.
"U. S. v. Holte, supra note 8 "there may be a degree of co-operation that
would not amount to a crime, as where it was held that a purchaser of spirituous liquor from an unlicensed vendor was not a crime in the purchaser,
although it was in the seller." (This dictum probably refers to a simple sale
not involving any transportation, especially since it refers to a case where
sale without license was the substantive offense; nor was a conspiracy charge
involved.)
'Lucadomo v. U. S., supra note 2, 657 "mere presence on the occasion of
the conspiracy is not sufficient to make one guilty."
'U. S. v. Lancaster, 44 Fed. 896, g29 (W. D. Ga. i8gi); Lucadomo v.
U. S., supra note 2, 657; Patterson v. U. S., 222 Fed. 599, 631 (C. C. A. 6th,
1915).
" But see Peop!e v. Strauch, 240 Ill. 6o, 88 N. E. 155 (io9).
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need not be a formal one," expressed either by word or deed.A The person
must incite, procure, or encourage the act and there must be such affirmative
co-operation as amounts to aiding and abetting. 7 In those cases where government agents have made purchases of prohibited articles to obtain evicence of illegal sales, the defense of entrapment, inducement, and conspiracy
by such agents with the accused for the commission of the crime has been
held bad'
As before 'indicated, the purchaser has not been held to be an
associate or a participant in the sale, " and a doubt has been expressed as to
whether he is a conspirator thereto." Although the words "conspire . . . to
commit" in the conspiracy statute mean only to "bring about,"" to hold that a
purchaser "brought about" the transportation of liquor where the only transportation involved is such as is the normal and necessary incident of the sale
itself places upon the purchaser's participation a higher premium of affirmative force and criminal responsibility than in the case of a mere sale, where
he is not a principal, accessory, or accomplice. But from a practical point of
view, although Kerper was not under any legal obligation to complete the
transaction, Norris, as the court pointed out, became a party to an agreement which called for Kerper to transport the liquor to Norris, and to be paid
for so doing. This case makes possible the prosecution of a certain group
of liquor purchasers by invoking the conspiracy statute, when purchase is not
in itself a substantive offense, and lends a strong hand to prohibition enforcement, especially since evidence obtained by wire-tapping is admissible in the
federal courts." But when the seller is alone being tried for the substantive
offense of selling, a purchaser may now refuse to testify if the sale involved
delivery at his request, thus limiting the government in a favored field of incriminating evidence.
CONTRACT WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS-VALIDITY

OF SUBSEQuENT

ORAL MoDnwICATIo-The defendant agreed in writing to exchange real estate

with the plaintiffs, a term of the contract being that the plaintiffs free their
property from liens and prepare a mortgage against it. The defendant later
agreed orally, for a consideration, to perform this for the plaintiffs. The
defendant rescinded, and resists the plaintiffs' action for specific performance on the ground that the plaintiffs have not fulfilled the terms of the written
contract, and cannot show the parol agreement to do away with the necessity
of this fulfillment. Held, that the plaintiffs are entitled to specific performance,
"Williamson v. U. S., 207 U. S. 426, 449, 28 Sup. Ct. 163, 171 (1907);
U. S. v. Olmstead, 5 F. (2d) 712 (W. D. Wash. 1925).
"Williamson v. U. S., supra note 15; Fisher v. U. S., 2 F. (2d) 843 (C.
C. A. 4th, 1924); Fisher v. U. S., i3 F. (2d) 756 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926).
' Lucadomo v. U. S., supra note 2, 657.
' Lucadomo v. U. S., supra note 2; Rossi v. (1. S., 293 Fed. 896 (C. C. A.
8th, 1923) (this case involved transportation as well as a sale); De Long v.
U. S., supra note 3.
" Supra notes 3 and 4.
' Supra note 5.
" U. S. v. Holte, supra note 8.
"Olmstead v. U. S., 277 U. S. 438, 28 Sup. Ct. 564 (1928).
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as the defendant cannot take advantage of the breach which he caused. Du
Bois v. Zimmerman, 28 F. (2d) 173 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928).
It is a well-settled rule that a written agreement not within the Statute 1
of Frauds may be modified by the subsequent oral agreement of the parties.
in
writto
be
of
Frauds
the
Statute
by
is
required
When the original contract
ing, as in the principal case, the question becomes what effect is to be given
a subsequent oral modification. A complete oral rescission is not effective when
the original contract creates an interest in land, because the rescission operates as a retransfer of the equitable estate.' There are a few cases contra
which overlook this reason? A variation of the contract by oral agreement is
not enforceable unless it is a complete contract not within the Statute of
Frauds.' The combined written and oral agreement .is not enforceable.' Some
courts have drawn a distinction between the formation of the contract and the
regulation of performance, and hold that the latter may be modified by a subsequent oral agreement.' The theory is that the oral promise is an accord,
and though executory, constitutes a bar if there is a tender of performance.
It would seem that this distinction is not sound, because an accord should not
be a bar unless received in satisfaction, 7 and because there is no clear line between what is substance and what is performance. Under the better view the
original written contract remains in force, and is the only one that can be
enforced. However, the subsequent oral agreement, though not enforceable
as a contract, may give rise to a defence in pais to the written contract. When
the oral agreement was such that it caused one of the parties to fail to perform a part of the written agreement, the other party cannot raise that failure
as an objection? It makes no difference whether the party introducing the subsequent parol agreement is the plaintiff or the defendant.' Sometimes the
disability to raise the objection has been characterized as an estoppel,"' and
15
VIGM.oR, EvIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §:2441.
'Barrett v. Durbin, io6 Ark. 332, 153 S. W. 265 (1913) ; Sanborn v. Murphy, 86 Tex. 437, 25 S. W. 6io (1894).
"Ely v. Jones, io Kan. 572, i68 Pac. 1IO2 (1917) ; Warden v. Bennett,
145 Ky. 325, 140 S. W. 538 (19I1).
'Rosenfeld v. Standard Bottling & Extract Co., 232 Mass. 239, 122 N. E_
299 (1919); Odell v. Barton, 249 Fed. 604 (C. C. A. 8th, i918).
5
Autem v. Mayer Coal Co., 98 Kan. 379, 158 Pac. 13 (i916); Jarman v.
Westbrook, i34 Ga. ig, 67 S. E. 403 (1910); Malkan v. Hemming, 82 Conn.
293, 73 Atl. 752 (9og) ; Pence v. Life, 104 Va. 518, 52 S. E. 257 (1905);
Warren v. A. B. Mayer Mfg. Co., 161 Mo. 112, 6i S. W. 644 (igoo).
'Hurlburt v. Fitzpatrick, 176 Mass. 287, 57 N. E. 464 (9oo) ; Cummings
v. Arnold, 3 Metc. 486 (Mass. 1842); WOOD, STATUTE OF FRAUDS (1884)
§ 403.
7
Reilly v. Barrett, 22o N. Y. 170, 115 N. E. 453 (1917).
'Imperator Realty Co. v. Tull, 228 N. Y. 447, 127 N. E. 263 (1920);
Hecht v. Marsh, 105 Neb. 5o2, i81 N. W. 135 (192o); Brede v. Rosedale
Terrace Co., 216 N. Y. 246, 1io N. E. 43o (1915); Neppach v. Oregon & California R. R. Co., 46 Ore. 374, 8o Pac. 482 (905); Hickman v. Haynes, L. R.
io C. P. 598 (1875).
'i WnimsToN, CoNTRAcrs (1924) § 595.
0
General Electric Co. v. National Contracting Co., 178 N. Y. 369, 7o N.
E. 928 (19o4).
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sometimes as a waiver," without regard to the accuracy of the description.
"
In either case the rule may be stated that one who induces another to breach
his written contract cannot set up that breach to defeat the claim of the other
on the written contract. Thus, though the plaintiffs cannot enforce the subsequent oral modification, the fact that it is not in writing cannot he used to
defeat their claim.

COURTS-JuRISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT TO REVIEW

BY WRIT OF ERROR THE JUDGMENT OF A STATE COURT UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF A MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE-The Judicial Code' allows direct appeals to
the Supreme Court from any judgment of a state court of last resort upholding the validity of a "statute of any state," which statute had been attacked
as unconstitutional. The validity of an ordinance of the City of Augusta was
so upheld by the Georgia Supreme Court. The case was appealed by writ
of error to the United States Supreme Court, and the jurisdiction of that
court under the Judicial Code was questioned. Held (Justices Brandeis and
Holmes dissenting), that the ordinance was a statute of the state within the
section conferring jurisdiction. King Manufacturing Co. v. Augusta, 48 Sup.
Ct. 489 (1927).
The Judicial Code in another section' provides for a three judge court in
any case in which an injunction is sought to restrain the enforcement of any
statute of a state "by restraining the action of any officer of such state" in
enforcing it. A petitioner sought to enjoin the Tax Collector of the City of
New York from collecting certain taxes assessed in pursuance of a state law,
and it was contended that a three judge court should hear the case. Held,
that the city officer was not an officer of the state within the meaning of the
code provision. In re Public National Bank of New York, 49 Sup. Ct. 43 (1928).
In the King case the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under § 237 of the
Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of 1925, was for the first time considered.'
Prior to its amendment this section provided for review by the Supreme Court
on writ of error where the validity of not only a state statute had been upheld,
but of "any authority exercised under a state" as well.' Many of the earlier

'Thompson

'EWART,

v. Poor, 147 N. Y. 402, 411, 42 N. E. 13 (1895).

ESTOPPEL (1900)

15, 70; EWART, WAIVER DISTRIBUTED (1917)

23, 143, 264.

'§ 237 (a), as amended by the AcT OF FEB. 13, 1925, C. 229, 43
'§ 266, as enacted June 18, 1910, c. 309, § 17, 36 STAT. 557.

STAT.

937.

* Since the AcT OF 1925 the Supreme Court has reviewed on writ of error
several judgments of state courts sustaining the validity of municipal ordinances. Among the cases are: Beery v. Houghton, 273 U. S. 671 (1926);
Clarke v. Deckeback, 274 U. S. 392 (1926).
But in none of these cases was
the Court's jurisdiction questioned, and they are therefore not binding on this
point. New v. Territory of Okla., 25 Sup. Ct. 68 (i9o4); Arant v. Lane,
245 U. S. 166 (1917).
'§ 25 of the ACT OF SEPT. 24, 1789, C. 20, I STAT. 85 .
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cases held that a municipal ordinance came within this latter clause 5 There
are many decisions by the Supreme Court, however, to the effect that such an
ordinance is a statute within the section 8 It is upon these latter decisions that
the Court in the Kizg case bases its judgment. But when the general purpose of the Act of 1925 is considered, the Court seems to be without sufficient
justification in doing so. Congress purposed to relieve the Supreme Court
by further limiting the absolute right of review by it,' and the omission of the
"authority" clause from § 237 appears to have been in furtherance of this purpose. The jurisdiction of the Court was thereby confined, under this section,
to cases involving a "statute of a state." To hold, on the authority of decisions made prior to the restricting amendment, that a municipal ordinance is
such a statute, is to deny effect to the legislative intent This becomes more
obvious when the National Bank case is examined. If a muncipal ordinance is a
"statute of a state" under § 237, then by the same reasoning a municipal officer
should be considered an "officer of the state" under §266. But a long line of
decisions, with which the National Bank case is in accord, properly holds
otherwiseY Yet the situation in the King case, and the section of the Judicial
Code controlling it, is entirely analogous, and in arriving at a directly opposite
result the Supreme Court seems to have set up an illogical distinction.
EASEMxExTs-REcipRocA.-Plaintiffs sought an injunction to force the defendant to keep the water in a lake at the artificial level which had been maintained by defendant's predecessor for some forty years, whereby he obtained
an easement to flood the plaintiffs' land. Plaintiffs had built estates in conformance with the new level and were damaged by the defendant intermittently lowering the water. Held, that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover on
several grounds, one being that as the defendant's predecessor obtained the
prescriptive right to raise the water level, the plaintiffs acquired a reciprocal
easement to have the water left at that level. Hammond and Others v. Ant5
Weston v. City of Charleston, 2 Pet. 448 (U. S. 1829) ; Home Ins. Co. v.
City Council, 93 U. S. 116 (1876) ; See Calhoun v. City of Seattle, 215 Fed.
226, 229 (914); cf. McLean v. Denver Co., 203 U. S. 38 (t9o6).
'Atlantic Coast Line v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548 (1913) in which the court
said, at p. 555: "An ordinance enacted by virtue of power delegated by the
state legislature is a state law within § 237 ;" Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U. S.
171 (914); Zucht v. King, 26o U. S. 174 (1922); cf. Bluefields v. Public
Service, 262 U. S. 679 (1922); Live Oak v. R. R. Commission, 269 U. S.
354, (1925).
"Moore v. Fidelity Co., 272 U. S. 317, 321 (1926) ; Smith v. Wilson, 273
U. S. 388, 390 (1926).
8 The Court might still, at its discretion, review by certiorari a judgment
of a state court involving the validity of a municipal ordinance. § 240 of the
JUDIcrAL CODE, amended by the Acr OF FEa. 13, 1925, C. 229, 43 STAT. 938.
9
Sperry v. City of Tacoma, i9o Fed. 682 (1911); Cumberland v. City of
Memphis, 198 Fed. 955 (1912), in which the court said: "The natural meaning
of 'statute of a state' within this section is a statute or law diriectly passed
by the legislature of the state, and the natural meaning of 'any officer of such
state' is an officer whose authority extends throughout the state and is not
limited to a small district." Ex parte Collins, 277 U. S. 565 (1928) ; Henrietta Mills Co. v. Rutherford County, 26 F. (2d) 799 (1928).
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werp Light and Power Company and Another, 132 Misc. 786, 230 N. Y. Supp.
621 (1928).
An easement through prescription arises when the owner of the land permits, for the statutory period, an adverse use such as would give rise to a
cause of action' The doctrine of reciprocal easements, which has been applied
only in the case of water rights, cannot be, and is not, generally accepted
Although the owner of the servient tenement may have been benefited by the
exercise of the easement, he has obtained no prescriptive right to have it continued, for there has been no use, adverse to the dominant tenant's rights, such
as would give rise to a cause of action.3 In the principal case the court decided for the plaintiffs on the ground that the easement obtained was to keep
the water at a very slightly fluctuating level and that in varying the level as
the defendant did he was increasing the burden on the servient estate. Then
the court mentioned reciprocal easements, and in discussing that said the plaintiffs were entitled to recover on the ground of equitable estoppel in that the
plaintiffs has incurred expenses on the belief that the owner of the dominant
tenement was going to continue the easement. Most of the cases supposedly
supporting the doctrine of reciprocal easements are really decided on other
grounds, such as estoppel, common easement, and increasing the servitude.'
'Miller and Lux v. Enterprise Canal and Land Co., 169 Cal. 415, 147 Pac.
567 (1915) ; Monarch Realestate Co. v. Frye, 77 Ind. App. 179, 133 N. E. 156
(1921). Compare the English doctrine of the right of lateral support for a

building acquired through prescription. Dalton v. Angus, 6 App. Cas. 740
(1881). But see Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199, 2o7 (877).
IWeare v. Chase, 93 Me. 264, 44 AtI. 9oo (i899) ; Brace v. Yale, 99 Mass.
488 (1868); Sparks Mfg. Co. v. Town of Newton, 57 N. J. Eq. 367, 44 At.
385 (1898); Felton v. Simpson, ii Ired. L. (33 N. C.) 84 (1850) ; Lake Drummond Canal & Water Co. v. Burnham et al., 147 N. C. 41, 6o S. E. 65o (918) ;
Vliet v. Sherwood, 33 Wis. 229 (1874); 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed.
1920)
3

§532.

Felton v. Simpson; Vliet v. Sherwood; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d
ed. Ig2o), all supra note 2; 3 FARNHAM, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS (1904)
§819; Note (1901) 5o L. R. A. 836 at 841.
'3 FARNHAM, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS (1904) § 828 says the only
cases actually depending on the theory are Kray v. Muggli, 84 Minn. go, 86
N. W. 882 (igoi); and Middleton v. Gregoria, 2 Rich. L. 631 (S. C. 1839);
although in the first case the court mentions equitable estoppel. In § 819a FARNHAM points out that Belknap v. Trimble, 3 Paige 577 (N. Y. 1832), the first
case to mention the doctrine, is supported on the grounds of riparian rights and
a common easement, so that the discussion of reciprocal easements was dictum;
§ 819b shows that the basis for deciding Smith v. Youmans, 98 Wis. 103, 70
N. W. 1115 (897), is that the owner of the dominant estate cannot increase
the servitude; while in § 828 he says Murchie v. Gates, 78 Me. 300, 4 Atl.
698 (1886), and Shepardson v. Perkins, 58 N. H. 354 (1878), are based on
implied grants, and Delaney v. Boston, 2 Harr. 489 (Del. 1839), and Mathewson v. Hoffman, 77 Mich. 420, 43 N. W. 879 (1889) are based on estoppel.
In Smith v. Youmans, supra, and in the later Wisconsin case of Village
of Pewaukee v. Savoy, i3o Wis. 271, 79 N. W. 436 (I8gg) the courts mention estoppel and also say that the artificial level becomes the natural level
after the prescriptive period. Estoppel was also applied in Shepardson v. Perkins, supra, and in Lakeside Paper Co. v. State, 15 App. Div. i69, 44 N. Y.
Supp. 281 (1897). In Ford v. Whitlock, 27 Vt. 285 (1854), the court said
that water put into an artificial channel was like the dedication of public land
and that with the passage of a short time it could not be changed if new
rights accrued.

RECENT CASES
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-VHEN STATUTE BEGINS RUNNING ON NOTES
PAYABLE ON DEMAND AFTER DATE, AND IN

A CERTAIN TIME AFTER NOTICE-

A note was made payable "on demand after date, with interest at six per cent.,
payable semi-annually, and at six per cent. from maturity until paid." The
payee sued the maker more than seven years after the date of the note, Mississippi having the usual six-year Statute of Limitations.' Held, that the
plaintiff could recover. Spiro v. Hardware Co., 118 So. 429 (Miss. 1928).
A note payable with three per cent. interest "three months after notice
after one year from date" was sued on almost twenty years after its date,
although within a short time after notice was given. Held, that the action
was barred by the Statute of Limitations. Bass v. Hueter, 270 Pac. 958 (Cal.
1928).
Both California and Mississippi have adopted the Negotiable Instruments
Law,' but it was not discussed in either of the principal cases. However, the
3
parts of the N. I. L. dealing with this phase of the subject define maturity
for the purposes of negotiation, whereas these actions were between the original parties, involving only maturity for the purposes of suit, so that the principles of common lav and the law merchant would seem properly applicable.
The general American rule is that a demand note matures for purposes of
suit at date, and therefore it is well settled that the statute begins running from
the date of the note,' or if not delivered on that day, from the day of delivery.' The fact that a demand note calls for the payment of interest,' whether
payment is to begin immediately or at some time after date," does not alter
the general rule. However, it seems ot be a recognized exception that actual
demand may be made a condition precedent to the cause of action accruing,
if such is the intention found expressed in the note In the Mississippi case
the court decided that because interest was to be paid semi-annually until
maturity, and after that annually, it showed an intent to postpone maturity
until actual demand, thus bringing the case within the exception mentioned
above. The note in the California case is not the same situation, since it was
1

§2635.
Miss. ANN. CODE (Hemingway, 1927) 1355-1385; California: Laws of i9*7, ch. 721.
3§§ 53, 70 and 7.
'Stevens' Estate, 164 Pa. 216, 3o Atl. 245 (1894) ; Re McCabe, 120 Misc.
280, 198 N. Y. Supp. 445 (923) ; Blick v. Cockins, 131 Md. 625, 1o2 Atl. 1022
(1917) ; Fletcher v. Sturtevant, 235 Mass. 249, 126 N. E. 428 (Ig2O) ; Knecht
v. Boshold, 138 Ill. App. 430 (I9O8); Hartland v. Jukes, 158 Eng. Reprint
1052 (1863) ; and see note 44 A. L. R. 397.
5Kraft v. Thomas, 123 Ind. 513, 24 N. E. 346 (1889).
'Norton v. Ellam, 2 M. & W. 467 (Eng. 1837) ; Re McCabe, supra note
4; Re Doremus, 215 Ill. App. 164 (x9*9); De Raismes v. De Raismes, 7o N. J.
Law I5, 56 Atl. 170 (1903); House v. Peacock, 84 Conn. 54, 78 At!. 723
(i9) ; contra: Baxter v. Beckwith, 25 Colo. App. 322, 137 Pac. 901 (913).
7
Loring v. Gurney, 22 Mass. 15 (1827); First National Bank v. Price,
52 Iowa 570 (1879).
'Stillivan v. Ellis, 219 Fed. 694 (C. C. A 8th, 1915); Boyd v. Buchanan,
iV6 Mo. App. 56, 162 S. W. 1075 (1915); Leonard v. Olson, 99 Iowa 163,
68 N. W. 677 (1896) ; semble, Baxter v. Beckwith, supra note 6; and see
Yates v. Goodwin, 96 Me. 90, 51 At. 8o4 (Igo).
Miss. ANN. CODE (Hemingway, 1927)

2Mississippi:
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payable "three months after notice." The general rule where notes are payable a certain time after demand or after sight is, that the statute does not
begin to run until such certain time after actual demand or actual sight.9 The
rule is the same where the words are "after notice." " But the corollary
which many decisions have engrafted on this rule is that notice will be presumed
to have been given after the lapse of a reasonable time,' although of course
the note itself may still show an intent to postpone payment indefinitely."
Some jurisdictions use the analogy of the statute to determine what is a reasonable time," and one of these is California, so that the decision in the principal case follows logically from that rule. Michigan" and Pennsylvania'
have used the equitable ground of laches, and have approved the analogy of
the statute as a test of reasonableness, although the intention actually expressed
in the note will always control the decision. 6
MANDAMUS-RIGHT

OF HOLDER OF MUNICIPAL

BONDS TO

CoMPEL

TAX

LEvY-Plaintiff, holding unpaid interest coupons on defendant's bonds, sought
a mandamus to compel defendant to pay the interest due by means of a tax
levy. A statute' and city ordinance provided that bonded indebtedness should
be paid through such a process. The answer of the defendant admitted the
obligation, but alleged that, in view of the already heavy taxes, an additional
tax would result in abandonment of property by citizens, and depreciation in
values, whereby defendant would be greatly injured. Plaintiff demurred, and
lower court granted the mandamus. Held, that the granting of the mandamus by the lower court was a discretionary act with which the appellate
court could not interfere. City of Victor et al. v. Halstead, 271 Pac. 185
(Colo. 1928).

Mandamus is an extraordinary legal remedy which seems largely controlled
by equitable principles.' As such, it appears to lie within the discretion of the
'Wenham v. Mohawk Ins. Co., 13 Wend. 267 (N. Y. 1835); Thorp v.
Coombe, 8 Dowl. & Ry. 374 (1826); Little v. Blunt, 9 Pick. 488 (Mass. 183o) ;
Massie v. Byrd, 87 Ala. 68i (1888); Cooke v. Pomeroy, 65 Conn. 466, 32 Atl.
935; (1895) ; Clayton v. Gosling, 5 B. & C. 36o (i826) ; Brown v. Rutherford, 14 Ch. D. 687 (i88o).
"Holmes v. Kerrison, 2 Taunt. 323 (Eng. i8o9); Clayton v. Gosling,
supra note 9.
'Williams v. Bergin, 116 Cal. 56, 47 Pac. 877 (0897), and cases cited;
Codman v. Rodgers, io Pick. 120 (Mass. i83o) ; Little v. Blunt, supra note
9; and see I WooD, LiuITATioNs (4th ed.) §§ 118 and 125.
'Keithler v. Foster, 22 Ohio St. 27 (1872).
'Daugherty v. Wheeler, 125 Ind. 421, 25 N. E. 540 (i889).
",Palmer v. Palmer, 36 Mich. 487 (0877).
'Morrison's Adm'r v. Mullin, 34 Pa. 12 (859); for a comment on the
weight of this and the Michigan case, see Rhind v. Hyndman, 54 Md. 527
(x88o)

and cf. Brown v. Rutherford, supra note 9.
v. Snyder, 269 Pa. 527, 112 Atl. 749

'Helfrich

(192i).

CoLO. SESS. LAws (1909) c. i44, § 5.
'Duncan Townsite Co. v. Lane, 245 U. S. 308, 38 Sup. Ct. 99 (1917);

Ex parte Skinner & Eddy Corporation, 265 U. S.86, 44 Sup. Ct. 446 (1923);
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It is, however, the peculiar remedy afforded creditors of municipal
court
corporations, who, unable to collect a claim through ordinary processes of
law, may, under statutory or charter provisions authorizing the payment of
municipal debts by tax levies, compel such a levy to satisfy their claims.'
Such a practice seems general throughout the United States, save in the New
England states, where through immemorial custom, the uiisatisfied creditor may
levy execution of his judgment on the property of a private citizen within the
corporate body3 The general, though not universal, rule requires that the
creditor reduce his claim to judgment before he may avail himself of the
remedy by mandamus.' It is well established that the holder of. municipal
bonds, to satisfy his claim, may compel the tax levy by mandamus; 7 and the
mandatory power of this writ is deemed preferable to the restrictive power
of a decree in equity. In granting the writ, however, the courts reserve in
themselves the right to order payment by the municipal corporation spread
over a short period of years, when considered advisable.' This practice, though
widespread, can be upheld only upon the broadest of equitable principles, for
Warehouseman's Ass'n of Port of New York v. Cosgrove, 241 N. Y. 58o,
I5O N. E. 563 (1925); HIGH, EXTRA ORDIARY LEGAL REMEDIES (3d ed. 1896)

§ 9. .Perry

v. Town of Samson, ii F. (2d) 655 (1926); Duncan Townsite
Co. v. Lane, Ex parte Skinner, both supra note 2; Fawkes v. City of Burbank et at., i88 Cal. 399, 205 Pac. 675 (1922) ; HiGo, loc. cit. supra note 2.
'East St Louis v. Amy, 120 U. S. 6oo, 7 Sup. Ct. 739 (887) ; Meriwether
v. Garrett, io2 U. S. 472 (i88o) ; Graham v. Folsom, 2oo U. S. 248, 26 Sup.
Ct 245 (io5); City of Cleveland v. U. S., i66 Fed. 677 (909); Commonwealth v. Councils of Pittsburg, 34 Pa. 496 (1859) ; Commonwealth v. Councils of Pittsburg, 88 Pa. 66 (1878); Munday v. Rahway, 43 N. J. L. 338
(1881); 4 DiLLoi, MuNicidAL CoBPoRATIoNs (5th ed. 1911) § i5o7.
In Illinois, where the judgment creditor is not permitted to levy execution on property belonging to the municipal corporation, on the theory that
such a procedure would interfere with the proper exercise of the corporation's
duties, the creditor seeks his mandamus immediately upon obtaining judgment,
without the necessity of showing a futile attempt at execution, as most other
states require: City of Chicago v. People, 98 Ill. App. 517 (190).
If the court realizes that the issuance of the inandamus would be unavailing, the request for the writ will be refused: State of Louisiana ex reL. Fazende v. New Orleans, 35 La. Ann. 221 (1883); Spiritual Atheneum Society
v. Randolph,' 58 Vt. 192, 2 Atl. 747 (1885).
'Hawkes v. Kennebeck, 7 Mass. 461, 463 (1811); Chase v. Merrimack
Bank, ig Pick. 564, 569 (Mass. 1837); Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344, 350
(1877); Beardsley v. Smith, i6 Conn. 368 (1844); Eames v. Savage, 77 Me.
212 (1885); 4 DiLLoN, Mu\,scnPAL CoRpoATIovs (5th ed. 1911) 2673.
Greene Co. v. Daniel, io2 U. S. 187 (i88o); People ex rel. Lawrence
v. Clark County, 50 Ill. 213 (i869); State ex reL. Little v. Township Committee, 37 N. J. L. 84 (1874).
'Walkley v. Muscatine, 6 Wall. 481 (U. S. x867) ; Rees v. City of Watertown, i9 Wall. 107 (U. S. 1873); Heine v. The Levee Commissioners, i9
Wall. 655 (U. S. 1873); Deuel County v. Bank of Buchanan, 86 Fed. 264
(1898).
'Graham v. Folsom, supra note 4; Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. i66
(U. S. 1867); Rees v. City of Watertown, supra note 7.
9
East St. Louis v. Amy, City of Cleveland v. U. S., both supra note 4;
Perry v. Town of Samson, supra note 3.
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it seems that the creditor's legal right to complete, immediate relief is recognized by the issuance of the mandamus' 0 Though the courts are willing to permit such protracted payment by the municipal corporation, they are loathe to
withhold the relief demanded by the creditor merely because of the financial
embarrassment occasioned thereby to the debtor n
MECHANIcs' LIEN-AsSIGNAmLITY BEFORE BEING PERFECTED---The owner

of land entered into a contract to have some buildings erected upon it. Subsequently *the contractor failed to pay the wages of the laborers, and the
surety of the contractor paid them in his stead. He obtained from the laborers
assignments of any rights or remedies which they could have pursued, expressly including the right to file a stop notice with the owner. After the
assignments the surety filed these stop notices. Held, that the surety obtained
a valid lien under the mechanics' lien statute.1 Homeopathic Hospital v. Gibbs,
143 At. 316 (N. J. 1928).

It is well settled in this country that a perfected mechanics' lien may be
assigned The right given to laborers and materialmen under the various
statutes is not considered as personal, and it is said that the legislature in
making such a gift would not bestow a bounty in the nature of an unassignable right without expressly declaring such to be its intent.' It is generally
held that a perfected mechanics' lien passes as an incident to the debt upon
an assignment of the latter.' There is a split of authority, however, as to
the assignability of the mere right to a mechanics' lien before the lien itself
10"The court has sometimes tempered the severity of the mandate by
spreading the burden over a short number of years. Confessedly, the practice
is not according to the legal rights of the parties, and it is only upon a very
broad equity that it can be sustained." Severens, J., in City of Cleveland v.
U. S., I66 Fed. 677, at 684 (909).
'City of Galena v. Amy, 5 Wall. 705 (U. S. 1866) ; City of Little Rock

v. U. S. ex rel. Howard, 1O3 Fed. 418 (1900).
1 MECHANIcS' LIEN AcT §§3 and 5 (3
COINIP. ST. [1910] 3294, 3298).
§ 3 provides that upon failure of a contractor to pay laborers or materialmen

any sums due them, the latter may file a notice in writing with the owner
of the sum due, and that thereupon the owner shall be authorized to retain
such sum from the contractor and pay it to the laborer or materialman. § 5
creates an inchoate lien in favor of laborers and materialmen on all money
in the hands of the owner due or to grow due to such laborers prior to the
statutory demand and notice.
' Davis v. Billsland, 18 Wall. 659 (U. S. 1873); Rauer v. Fay, 11o Cal.
361, 42 Pac. 9o2 (1895) ; Sprague Co. v. Lumber Co., i1 Colo. App. 107, 6o
Pac. 179 (1899) ; Logue v. Walker, 141 Ga. 644, 81 S. E. 849 (1914) ; Ittner
v. Hughes, 154 Mo. 55, 55 S. W. 267 (1900) ; Hoagland v. Van Elten, 31 Neb.
292, 47 N. W. 920 (1891) ; Lawrence v. Church. 164 N. Y. 115, 58 N. E. 24
(1915); Hill v. Alliance Co., 6 S. D. 16o, 6o N. W. 752 (1894); Land Co.
v. Jordan, 5 Wash. 729, 32 Pac. 729 (1893).

' PHILLIPS, MECHANIcS' LIENS
LIENS (1897)
§§9-11.

(3d ed. 1893) § 55; BoisoT,

MEcIANICS'

"Soule v. Borelli, 8o Conn. 392, 68 Atl. 979 (1908); Nottingham v. McKendrick, 38 Ore. 495, 63 Pac. 822 (1901).
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is perfected. The view that such an inchoate right is unassignable' rests
upon the reasoning that the statute gives nothing until the condition precedent
of notice to the owner is performed, and that the assignee cannot cure the
defect by giving the notice himself. The opposite view, that such an inchoate
right is assignable,' while probably not objectionable on any ground of public policy, would seem to be unwarranted on the basis of a strict interpretation of the usual mechanics' lien statutes. The New Jersey statute, however,
is construed to give the laborer not merely an inchoate right to a lien, but
an inchoate lien, as shown by the fact that the owner cannot defeat the lien
by making advance payments to the contractor, if the stop notice is given
7
While this construction may be
him before payment is due the contractor.
the principal case would follow
of
the
decision
questioned, if it is correct,
logically, for such an inchoate lien would seem to be sufficiently a property
right as to be assignable under modern views.
ON LAND OF
MINES AND MINERALS-ABANDONMENT OF CuILm DEposITF
ANOTHER-The owner of a coal mine deposited culm at intervals upon adjoining land which he knew to be the property of defendant's grantor. Culm
at that time was considered useless and unmarketable refuse, and the pile in
question was freely and continuously depleted by strangers, to the knowledge
of the mine owner and without objection on his part, though no payment was
made to him or permission obtained. The small sized coal mixed with the culm
has subsequently been found to be marketable, and the executor of the mine
owner sues the defendant, the present owner of the land on which the culm
was deposited, in trespass for conversion, more than fifty years after the
first deposits were made. Held, that the mine owner had abandoned the culm,
relinquishing all title and interest to it as each deposit was made. FidelityPhiladelphia Trust Co. v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 294 Pa. 47, 143 Atl. 474
(1928).
To constitute abandonment there must be a voluntary and unequivocal act
of relinquishment of the possession of a thing by its owner, with the concurrent and unconditional intention of terminating his ownership therein, but
1
Abandonment is distinguishwithout intent to vest it in any other person.

'Building Ass'n v. Ware, 158 Ark. 137, 249 S. W. 545 (1923)i; Rauer
v. Fay, supra note 2; Fleming v. Greener, 173 Ind. 260, 87 N. E. 719 (1909) ;
Frailey v. Railroad Co., 96 Ky. 570, 29 S. W. 446 (1895) ; Noll v. Kennealby,
37 Neb. 879, 56 N. W. 722 (1894) ; Loud v. Realty Co., 72 Ore. 155, 142 Pac.
785 (1914) ; Dexter v. Sparkman, 2 Wash. 65, 25 Pac. io7o (18gi).
'Lumber Co. v. Building Ass'n, 104 Ala. 584, 18 So. 48 (1894); Claflin
v. Nichols, 211 Ill. App. IO9 (1918); Peatman v. Light Co., 1o5 Iowa I, 74
N. W. 689 (1898) ; Grain Co. v. Milk Co., 214 Mich. 306, 183 N. W. 88/
(1921) ; Kinney v. Ore. Co., 58 Minn. 455, 6o N. W. 23 (1894) ; Mapel v.
Lumber Co., io3 Okla. 249, 229 Pac. 793 (1924) ; Hill v. Alliance Co., supra
note 2.

7
Slingerland v. Binns, 56 N. J. Eq. 413, 39 Atl. 712
Bldg. Ass'n v. Williams, 59 N. J. Eq. 617, 43 Atl. 669
Dodge -& Bliss Co., 59 N. J. Eq. 584, 44 Atl. 639 (1899).
'Lindbloom v. Rocks. 146 Fed. 66o (C. C. A. 9th, 19o6)
folk, 42 Conn. 377 (1875) ; Miller v. Cresson, 5 WI-atts & S.

(1898); Bayonne
(1899); Smith v.
; Stevens v. Nor284 (Pa. 1843).
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able from gift, sale, loss, surrender, and from the extinguishment of the right
of property by estoppel in pais or laches. Personal property, incorporeal
hereditaments acquired otherwise than by deed, and inchoate and equitable
rights in realty can be the subjects of abandonment. At common law, legal
title to real estate could not be abandoned,' but that rule has been much relaxed, and completely overthrown in several states 3 The burden of showing
an abandonment rests on him who asserts it, in the absence of very strong
circumstances suggesting abandonment.' From the nature of the case there
is no general rule as to just what evidence is sufficient; the question of intent
must be resolved from a consideration of all the facts and circumstances of
the case.' Non-user' or non-payment of taxes 7 by themselves are insufficient
to establish abandonment. Lapse of time is not a necessary element, but
may be useful as throwing light on intention
The value of the property
to the owner at the time of the alleged abandonment is considered competent
evidence,' as are his declarations
The intention to abandon the culm in the
principal case would seem to be unquestionably clear from a consideration of
the nature of the property and the conduct of the owner. The principal value
of the decision is its application of the law of abandonment to a particular
commodity which has acquired a new and important commercial aspect during recent years.
NUISANcE-ABSENCE

OF NEGLIGENCE--EcoNomIC

UNAVOIDABILITY

AS

DE-

FExsF,-Plantiff sought a decree restraining defendants from so conducting
their blasting operations in their quarry as to jar plaintiff's house and cast
stones upon his land. No negligence was alleged, but defendants failed to
prove that the prevention of further damage would require an expenditure depriving them of all profit. Held, that issue of the decree was proper. Beecher
v. Dull, i43 AtI. 498 (Pa. 1928).
The general problem is the result of the clash between the conflicting interests of the landowner in the enjoyment of his property and of his neighbor
not to be harmed by such enjoyment' The original Pennsylvania rule was
2 Tenn. Oil, etc. Co. v. Brown, 131 Fed. 696 (C. C. A. 6th, 1904) ; Kreamer v. Voneida, 213 Pa. 74, 62 Atl. 51S (9o5).
'Dikes v. Miller, 24 Tex. 417, 424 (1859).
'Hennessy v. Murdock, 137 N. Y. 317, 33 N. E. 330 (1893); Adams v.
Hodgkins, io9 Me. 361, 364, 84 Atl. 530, 531 (912).
5
Wilson v. Cleaveland, 30 Cal. 192, 202 (1866).
'Queen v. Corley, 7 Q. B. 515 (1848); Welsh v. Taylor, 134 N. Y. 450,
31 N. E. 896 (1892).
Philadelphia v. Riddle, 25 Pa. 259 (i855).
'Creevy v. Breedlove, 12 La. Ann. 745 (857).
'Kee & Chapell Dairy Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 214 Ill. App. i, aff'd,
Ill. 248, 126 N. E. 179 (i92o) ; see note (1922) 6 MINN. L. REv. i49.
10
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Turner v. Markham, 155 Cal. 562, 103 Pac. 319 (I9o9).

""Sic utere tuo ut alienum non lacdas." McCune v. Pittsburgh Coal Co.,
238 Pa. 83, 9o, 85 Ati. iio2, 1105 (1913).

RECENT CASES
stated in the famous case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson? There
defendant mine operators polluted a stream, which was their natural outlet,
by pumping their mine water into it. 'In finally deciding that the defendants
were not liable,' the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (three judges dissenting)
laid down the rule that where in the natural enjoyment of one's property, another is injured, without negligence or malice, such injury is damnum absque
injuria.' The doctrine was clearly based upon the desire to facilitate the development of Pennsylvania's unique mineral wealth.5 It has been followed in
a few cases, but has been severely criticized and has been rejected by the great
weight of authority.7 Even in Pennsylvania, its broad rule has been narrowed
by later decisions to the facts then before the court8 These decisions have held
the rule inapplicable to cases of manufacturing," transportation,"0 artificially
conducted drainage to a non-natural outlet," and even to mining cases where
2 113 Pa. 126, 6 Atl. 453 (I886).
'There had been three previous decisions of the same case by the Supreme
Court, all in favor of the plaintiff.- 86 Pa. 401 (x878) ; 94 Pa. 3o2 (i88o) ;
i2
Pa. 370 (1883).
The three judges who had come to the bench since the
first decision all voted for non-liability.
' Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, supra note 2, at 146, 6 Atl. at 456.
This rule has generally been considered a rejection of Rylands v. Fletcher,
L. R. i Ex. 265 (1866), L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868), which the Pennsylvania
court criticizes at 150, 152, 6 Atl. at 460, 462.
'Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, supra note 2, at 144, 6 Atl. at 454.
This ratio decidendi is approved in Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher
(1911) 59 U. oF PA. L. REV. 298, 389, note 71. For criticisms, see Strobel
v. Kerr Salt Co., 164 N. Y. 303, 319, 58 N. E. 142, 146 (igoo); Gest, The
Natural Use of Land (1894) 42 U. OF PA. L. Rv. I.
'Barnard v. Shirley, 135 Ind. 547, 34 N. E. 6oi (1893); Salem Iron Co.
v. Hyland, 74 Ohio St. 16o, 77 N. E. 751 (igo6) ; Wheeler v. Fisher Oil Co.,
6 Ohio N. P. 309 (1899) ; see concurring opinion of Ailshie, J., in Hill v.
Standard Mining Co., 12 Idaho 223, 242, 85 Pac. 907, 913 (i9o6) ; Ohio Oil Co.
v. Westfall, 43 Ind. App. 661, 88 N. E. 354, 355 (igog) ; Phillips v. Lawrence
Brick Co., 72 Kan. 643, 82 Pac. 787 (1905) semble. Contra: Penn Glass Co.
v. Schwimm, 177 Ind. 645, 98 N E. 715 (1912) ; Straight v. Hover, 79 Ohio
St. 263, 87 N. E. 174 (igog).
' Sussex Land Co. v. Midwest Refining Co., 294 Fed. 597 (C. C. A. 8th,
1923); Drake v. Lady Ensley Iron Co., 1o2 Ala. 501, 14 So. 749 (1893);
Beach v. Sterling, 54 N. J. Eq. 65, 33 Atl. 286 (I895) ; Strobel v. Kerr Salt
Co., supra note 5; Straight v. Hover, 79 Ohio St. 263, 87 N. E. 174 (i99);
Young v. Bankier Distilling Co., [1893] A. C. 691.
"Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 208 Pa. 54o, 549, 57 AtI. 1o65,
io68 (i9o4); Note (1914) 62 U. OF PA. L. REV. 212.
' Manufacturing is not a natural use in the sense that it is necessary to and
depends upon the resources of the land upon which it is conducted. Unlike
mining, it may be removed. Robb v. Carnegie, 145 Pa. 324, 22 Atl. 649 (1891);
Evans v. Reading Chemical Co., 16o Pa. 209, 28 Ad. 702 (i894).
'"Hauck v. Tidewater Pipe Line Co., 153 Pa. 366, 26 Atl. 644 (1893) (oil
pipe line). Accord: Helms v. Eastern Kan. Oil Co., 102 Kan. 164, 169 Pac.
208 (1917).
'McCune v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 238 Pa. 83, 85 AUt. 1o2 (1913) (mine
water) ; Good V. Altoona, 162 Pa. 493, 29 Atl. 741 (1894) (public sewage).
Accord: Frankfort v. Slipher, 162 N. E. 241 (Ind. App. 1928) (public sewage). But cf. City of Valparaiso v. Hagen, 153 Ind. 337, 54 N. E. iO62
(1897) (public sewage).
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its application would contravene a public interest. " These decisions proceed on
the theory that the situations thus excepted were never intended to be governed by the Sanderson case. But in other cases, such as the instant case, the
influence of the doctrine persists in modified form. Here the rule is that where
the damage is avoidable only at a cost so prohibitive as practically to deprive
the defendant of the use of his property, equity will not enjoin, nor, in the
absence of actual trespass, will the defendant be liable in damages.
But, as
declared in the instant case, the burden is upon the defendant to show this
"economic necessity." "4 Failure to sustain this burden of proof subjects the
defendant to liability, even though the plaintiff failed to allege negligence, for
it is uniformly held that negligence is not an element of nuisance.
In considering petitions to enjoin nuisances, Pennsylvania courts frequently follow the
minority view that the relative injury that will be done by refusing or granting such injunctions will be considered' 0 But this point was not discussed in
the instant case, for the "balance of injury" may not be .considered where an
actual trespass has been committed'
Therefore, since defendant's blasting had
broken plaintiff's close, the court could not consider the relative injury that
might be done, and issue of the decree was proper.
RESULTING TRUSTS-CONVEYANCE OF TRUST PROPERTY TO SECURE CREDITOR
OF CESTUI QuE TRusT-RIGHTS OF CREDITORS OF TRUSTEE-A father purchases

land with money he holds as guardian for his minor son, taking title in his
own name. Credit is extended to him in reliance on his representations that
he is owner. Within four months of his bankruptcy, at the request of his son,
'This is true whether the plaintiff is the public, or whether it is a public
service corporation. Commonwealth v. Russel, 172 Pa. 5o6, 33 Atl. 709 (1896) ;
Pennsylvania R. R. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 281 Pa. 233, 126 Atl. 386 (1924).
This exception has recently been extended to a case where both parties were
coal companies, on the ground that they were thus equally supplying a necessity to the public, and were therefore on equal ground. Lehigh Coal Co. v.
Pittston Coal Mining Co., 289 Pa. 492, 137 Atl. 672 (I927).
1Collins
v. Chartiers Val. Gas Co., 131 Pa. 143, i8 Atl. 1012 (1890)

Pfeiffer v. Brown, I6s Pa. 267, 3o Atl. 844 (1895); McCune v. Pittsburgh
Coal Co., supra note ii. Substantially the same result is obtained in some
cases in other jurisdictions by the rule of "reasonable use." Niagara Oil Co.
v. Jackson, 48 Ind. App. 238, 91 N. E. 825 (i9io); Wheeler v. Fisher Oil
Co., 6 Ohio N. P. 309 (1899). New York cases have allowed practical necessity as a defense in blasting cases where there was neither negligence, nor
technical trespass, and the damage was due solely to concussion or jarring.
Booth v. Rome, etc., R. R., 14o N. Y. 267, 35 N. E. 592 (893) ; Hill v. Schneider, 13 App. Div. 299, 43 N. Y. Supp. i (1897).
"Pfeiffer v. Brown, supra note I3; McCune v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., supra

note II.
'Hauck v. Tidewater Pipe Line Co., supra note io; Stokes v. Penna.
R. R., 2r4 Pa. 415, 63 Atl. 1028 (I9O6). Accord: Niagara Oil Co. v. Ogle,
177 Ind. 292, 98 N. E. 6o (1912).
" Richard's Appeal, 57 Pa. 105 (1868); Huckenstine's Appeal, 70 Pa. io2_
(I871); Dilworth's Appeal, 91 Pa. 247 (1879).
Contra: Sullivan v. Jones

& Laughlin Steel Co., supra note 8.
17 Walters v. McElroy, 151 Pa. 549, 25 Atl. 125 (1892) ; Quinn v. American Spiral Spring Co., 293 Pa. 152, 141 Atl. 855 (1928).
v. Wilson-Case Lumber Co., 58 Ore. 48, 113 Pac. 52 (1911).

Accord: Bourne

RECENT CASES
he conveys the land to his wife as security for loans she has made to the
son. A bill is brought to set aside this conveyance as in fraud of creditors
and to apply the property in satisfaction of a judgment secured by creditors
of the father some months after the conveyance. From a decree for the
plaintiff the defendant appeals. .Held, that the conveyance shall not be set
aside, being made by the father as trustee for the son for a full and valid
consideration and before a judgment was secured against him; that the wife,
having had no knowledge of her husband's representations, is not estopped
from denying his ownership. Thomas et ux. v. Sullivan, 28 F. (2d) 255 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1928).
A resulting trust arises where a purchase is made by one in his own
name with funds which are in his hands in a fiduciary capacity. So, if a
guardian or other trustee purchase with the money of his ward or other
cestui que trust, a court of equity will fasten a trust upon the property in
favor of the persons beneficially entitled to the money.' This trust, resulting
by operation of law, is not affected either by the Statute of Frauds2 or the
Statute of Uses It is to be performed or executed by the trustee by transferring the title to the cestui que trust at his request' A conveyance of the
trust property with the concurrence of the cestui who is sid juris, practically
terminates the trust as to that property, since the concurrence of the cestui
has the effect of passing the equitable title The cestui of a resulting trust,
however, loses his right to trust property which has passed to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the trust
On the other hand, as against
attaching and judgment creditors of the trustee in his private capacity, the
cestui has the better right, in the absence of special circumstances 7 and
creditors will not be heard to complain if the trustee executes the trust by
'Gogherty v. Bennett, 37 N. J. Eq. 87 (1883) ; Pugh v. Pugh, 9 Ind. 132
(1857); Bank of Cottonwood v. Henriques, 266 Pac. 836 (Cal. App. 1928);
2 SUGDEN, VENDORS (8th Am. ed. 1873) 7o4; Hu.L, TRUSTEES ( 4 th Am. ed.
1867) 91-92; TnANY & Buu-.AR, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEEs (862) 32; I
TIFFANY, REAL PROPFRTY, (2d ed. I920) 397.
2
Depeyster v. Gould, 3 Green's Ch. 474 (N. J.1836) ; Bancroft v. Ansen,
I3Allen 5o (Mass. 1866).
'Stacy v.Stacy, 300 S.W. 437 (Ark. 1927) ; Reid v. Barry, 112 So. 846,
854 (Fla. 1927). Contra: Hutchins v. Heywood, 5o N. H. 491 (I871).
'Millard v. Hathaway, 27 Cal. iig (1865); I TiFFANY, op. cit. supra
note 1,415.
5Unless, of course, the concurrence is merely to a change of trustees. Lemen v. McComas & Downey, 63 Md. 153 (1884); Matthews v. Thompson, 186
LMass. 14, 71 N. E. 93 (19o4) ; PERRY, TRUSTS (6th ed. 191i) § 921.
8
Conover v. Beckett, 38 N. J. Eq. 384 (1884) ; H. W. Ballentine, Purchase
for Value and Estoppel (i921) 6 MINN. L. REV. 87, 120; G. P. Costigan,
Protecting Purchasers for Value (1924) 12 CAi. L. R. 356.
7
Houghton v. Davenport, 74 Me. 590 (1883); Hackett v. Callender, 32
Vt. 97 (i859) where the court says, at page io8: "There is an obvious difference in the equities of a bona fide purchaser of land without notice of a
trust and of a creditor who attaches to secure an antecedent debt. The purchaser advanceg' hiS money to buy the land. He parts with a new value on
the credit of the apparent title. The attaching creditor merely seeks to secure
an old debt." Waterman v. Buckingham, 79 Conn. 286, 64 Atl. 212 (Igo6);
School Dist. No. Xo v. Peterson, 74 Minn. 122, 128, 76 N. W. 1126, II28 (I898).
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a conveyance, at the direction of the cestui.' Such special circumstances
are not present when the creditor, though he has no notice of the trust, gives
no value in reliance on the apparent title of the trustee;' nor are they if
consideration is given with notice of the trust." Finally, even though consideration is given without notice of the trust, but in reliance on the declarations of the trustee alone, the cestui is not precluded from asserting his right?'
A creditor, therefore, to overcome the right of the cestui, would seem to have
to establish an estoppel, that is, not only that he gave value without notice of
the trust, in reliance on the legal title of the trustee, but also that he was
lead to part with such value in reliance on some act or declaration of the
cestui."
SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS-DETERMINATION

As ALLOWING

OF TRUSTEE TO PAY OVER INCOME

PAYMENT-Testator left money upon
two trusts, the trustees to pay to his son so much of the income as they in
their absolute and uncontrolled discretion should deem fit and desirable.' The
trustees determined to pay the son all the income in quarter yearly installments,
and regularly credited him on the trust books with the net income as received,
making payments accordingly. At the son's death, about $36,000.00 of income
accrued since the last quarterly payment stood to his credit on the trust
books. Upon suit between the son's executrix and the trust remaindermen
for payment of this sum by the trustees, held, that the money must be paid
to the executrix. Cromwell v. Converse, 143 Atl. 416 (Conn. 1928).
BENEFICIARY TO COMPEL

'First National Bank of Lewiston v. Dwelley, 72 Me. 223 (1881) (conveyance upheld in absence of fraudulent intent); Stratton v. Edwards, 174
Mass. 374, 54 N. E. 886 (1899).

'McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Griffin, 116 Iowa 397, 401, 9o
N. W. 84, 85

(1902);

Robinson v. Robinson,

Gottstein v. Wist,
22

22

Wash. 581, 61 Pac. 715 (1900);

Iowa 427 (1867) ; Bank of Cottonwood v. Henriques,

mspra note I.
'0 Martin v. Remington, 100 Wis. 540, 76 N. W. 614 (1898) ; Bancroft v.
Ansen, 13 Allen 5o (Mass. 1866) ; Pollman v. Curtice, 255 F. 628 (C. C. A. 8th,
1919).

"Stratton v. Edwards, supra note 8. The court says on page 378, 54 N. E.
at 887: "In making the conveyance which she did at her husband's request,
Mrs. M. was only carrying into effect the trust upon which she held the
property, and we do not see how her creditors have any just ground of
complaint . . . Her creditors have no right to the property if it was

lawfully held by her in trust for her husband. Declarations made by her as
to her title, in his absence and without his knowledge or authority, cannot
bind him, and we find nothing in his conduct which can operate by way of
estoppel to prevent him from setting up his right to the property." Breeze v.
Brooks, 97 Cal. 72, 8i Pac. 742 (i892).
'Pierce v. Hower, 142 Ind. 626, i42 N. E. =

(1895); Hopkins v. Joyce

et ux., 78 Wis. 443, 47 N. W. 722 (1890).
'The first read to pay "in such manner, proportion, and amounts .

. . . trustees in their absolute and uncontrolled discretion shall
deem fit;" the second to pay "in quarter yearly installments, so much . . .
aitd only so much . . . as my . . . trustees in their absolute discretion may think necessary and desirable for the proper maintenance and support" of the son. The court treats both trusts alike.
as my

RECENT CASES
Where they are recognized,2 a direction of this kind would seem to create
a spendthrift trust,3 and the court here considers this trust to be such. By
that type trust the settlor insures the object of his bounty against his own
improvidence,' for the beneficiary having only a limited or qualified right
to the income,' cannot alienate it by anticipation, nor can his creditors subject
it to attachment.' The majority of this court agree that no title to the
income can vest in the beneficiary prior to its actual payment to him by the
trustees, but consider that the action of the trustees in crediting the income
to the son on the trust books, amounts to a continuing determination on their
part that he be paid the same, which "was revocable in his lifetime, but became
irrevocable upon his decease." 8 A dissenting judge is of opinion that while
the trustees may in their discretion pay the executrix the accrued income,
they have not by reason of the death of the beneficiary lost their control
thereof. But since the testator gives to the trustees the discretion as to
the amount of income which shall be paid, it is manifestly his intention that
they only should exercise that power.? The right to so provide is his," for it
is his property of which he is directing the disposition. The holding of the
court seemingly denies this right by substituting for the discretion of the
trustees the discretion of the court,' and no sufficient reason is apparent why
the executrix should be entitled to a mandatory holding that the trustees pay
her when the deceased could not have compelled payment to him.
.'The majority of American jurisdictions favor such trusts. A minority
and England are contra. i PERRY ONr TRUSTS (6th ed. 19II) §386a; 26 Am.
& ENG. ENcy. OF LAw (2d ed. IO4) 138, 139.
'Cf. Berry v. Dunham, 2oz Mass. 133, 88 N. E. 904 (igog); FomuLx,
TREATIsE ON THE RULE AGAINST PRPrurIES (i909)

§ 279 (opposing such

interpretation).
' Kessner v. Phillips, i89 Mo. 515, 523 (igo5) ; 26 AM. & ENG. ENcy. OF
LAW (2d ed. i9o4) 138.

Steib v. Whitehead, iii Ill. 247 (884).
"Mason v. R. I. Hospital Trust Co., 78 Conn. 8i, 6i Atl. 57 (Io5) ; Holmes
v. Bushnell, 8o Conn. 233, 67 Atl. 479 (19o7) ; Broadway National Bank v.
Adams, 133 Mass. I70 (1882).

7
Roberts v. Stevens, 84 Me. 325, 24 Atl. 873, 17 L. R. A. 266 (1892);
Jackson Square Loan Ass'n v. Bartlett, 95 Md. 66I (i9oz); Keyser v. Mitchell, 67 Pa. 473 (1871); cf. Garland v. Garland, 87 Va. 758, 13 S. E. 478,
13 L. R. A. 212 (I89I) (creditors furnishing supplies for support of beneficiary allowed to attach). This proposition is modified by statute in some

jurisdictions, as Pennsylvania; Acr OF MAY

1O, I92i,

P. L. 434, PA. STAT. (West,

Sup. 1928) § 9o79a; cf. Moorehead's Estate, 289 Pa. 542 (1g7) in 76 U. oiF
PA. L. REV. 220.
82 SCHOUIER

ON WIS (6th ed. 1923) § 1296 and Union Safe Deposit and
Trust Co. v. Dudley, 104 Me. 297, 72 Atl. I66 (igog), cited in support of this
proposition, are not in point, the income being vested in enjoyment in the

beneficiary.

Welch v. Apthorp, 203 Mass. 249, 89 N. E. 432, 27 L. R. A. (N.

s.) 449 (I909), also cited, is clearly distinguishable, since the income while
inalienable by the beneficiary, was payable to him absolutely.
'Particularly since the trustees appointed by the testator were friends and
business associates.
" 0Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716, (1875); Broadway National Bank v.
Adams, supra note 6.
'Nichols v. Eaton, supra note 1o; Leavitt v. Bierne, 21 Conn. i (85o)
(in accord with the dissenting opinion of the principal case.)
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TRANSFER OF STOCK-BONA FIDE PtncHAsms-GiFrs-The defendant
was a bona fide pledgee of certain stock certificates endorsed in blank, which
had been stolen from the plaintiff by a messenger to whom they had been
intrusted for delivery. The plaintiff seeks to cancel the pledged certificates.
Held, that the defendant is entitled to the shares pledged to it, subject only
to redemption by the plaintiff should he pay the debt owed the defendant.
Turnbull v. Longacre Bank et al., 249 N. Y. 159 (1928).
A recent Illinois decision held that the donee of stock acquired title thereto
by a transfer on the corporate books, the donor retaining possession of the
certificates but notifying the donee of the transfer. Chicago Title & Trust
Co. v. Ward, 163 N. E. 319 (Ill. 1928).
Shares of corporate stock are the subject of ownership by the individual
shareholders 1 Stock certificates are merely evidence of the ownership of the
shares represented thereby 2 and neither their existence nor transfer is essential to a valid transfer of the shares.' In order to facilitate the rapid turnover of stock, title thereto may be transferred without registration of the
transfer upon the corporate records,' even though the by-laws or charter of
the corporation state that such registration is necessary to the passage of title!
The Uniform Stock Transfer Act, adopted by New York,' specifically provides

'Jellinik v. Huron Mining Co., 177 U. S. I, 20 Sup. Ct. 559 (1899) ; Young
v. Pedrara Onyx Co., 48 Cal. App. 1, 192 Pac. 55 (1920) ; Greenleaf v. Board
of Review, 184 Ill. 226, 56 N. E. 295 (igoo); Herrick v. Humphrey Hardware Co., 73 Neb. 8og,

1O3

N. W. 685 (19o5); see Jacob v. Reynaud,

152

La. 354, 387, 93 So. 21, 133 (1922).
2West v. Insurance Co., 242 Fed. 6o5 (W. D. Wash. 1917), rev'g 237 Fed.
303 (W. D. Wash. 1916); Herrick v. Humphrey Hardware Co., supra note
i; Cartwright v. Dickinson, 88 Tenn. 476, 12 S. W. io3O (1889); Lipscomb

v. Condon, 56 W. Va. 416, 49 S. E. 392 (1904) ; see Commonwealth v. Peebles,
134 Ky. 121, 126, 119 S. W. 774, 775 (1909).
'West Coast Faucet Co. v. Wulff, 133 Cal. 315, 65 Pac.

22

(19oi) ; Young

v. Pedrara Onyx Co., supra note 1; Ford v. Howgate, io6 Me. 517, 76 At. 939
(1910) ; Lipscomb v. Condon, supra note 2.

'Title to shares may pass by delivery of an unendorsed stock certificate.
Massengale v. Hodgson, 148 Ga. 97, 95 S. E. 975 (1918) ; Smith v. Meeker,
153 Iowa 655, 133 N. W. 1O58 (1912) ; Wood v. Stoneham, 206 App. Div. 507,
N. Y. Supp. 483 (1923) ; Talbot v. Talbot, 32 R. I. 72, 78 Atl. 535 (91)
;

201

Richmond Nat. Bank v. Holland, 99 Va. 495, 39 S. E. 126 (igoi). But cf.
UNIFORMA STOcK TRANSFER AcT, § 9. By delivery of an endorsed certificate.
In re 35%. Automobile Supply Co., 247 Fed. 377 (S. D. N. Y. 1917); Bank of
Guntersville v. Fidelity Co., 201 Ala. 19, 75 So. 168 (1917) ; Brittan v. Oakland Bank, 124 Cal. 282, 57 Pac. 84 (1899); Dewey v. Barnhouse, 83 Kan.
12, 1O9 Pac. 994 (Igio).
By delivery of certificate with a written assignment
or power of attorney to transfer the shares. West v. Insurance Co., supra
note 2; Scott v. Flint River Pecan Co., 159 Ga. 668, 126 S. E. 769 (I925)';
Swigart v. Stoops, 204 Ill. App. 194 (1917) ; Harris v. Harris, 222 Ill. App.
164 (1921) ; Garfield Banking Co. v. Argyle, 64 Utah 572, 232 Pac. 541 (1924).
' Such provisions are held to be for the benefit of the corporation and its
creditors only. Culloden Bank v. Bank of Forsyth, 12o Ga. 575, 48 S. E. 226
(1904) ; Wallace v. Citizens' State Bank, 205 Ill. App. 7

(1917).

Baltimore Brick Co. v. Mali, 65 Md. 93, 3 Atl. 286 (1885).
'PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW, §§ 162-185; N. Y. ANN. CoNxs.
1917), c. 41, art. 6, §§ 162-185.

LAWS

Contra:

(2d ed.

RECENT CASES
that title to stock shall pass by delivery of the certificate without registration'
In many instances the transferee has been held to acquire better title to the
shares than that held by his transferor, raising the idea that stock certificates
are negotiable in character.8 But stock certificates are not negotiable instruments Decisions which give the transferee better title than that of his transferor should be based upon the theory of estoppel, operating against the recorded owner in favor of the bona fide purchaser of the certificates." The
Uniform Stock Transfer Act, however, practically gives stock certificates the
effect of negotiable instruments.Y The decision in the New York case may
be supported on these grounds." Aside from the Uniform Stock Transfer Act,
which makes delivery of the certificates necessary to a valid transfer of
shares," a transfer of title thereto will be upheld when registered on the corporate books, even though no delivery of certificates is made.' But inasmuch
'Under § I: Succession of McGuire, 151 La. 514, 92 So. 40 (1922) ; Hale
v. Sugar Co., 2oo App. Div. 577, 193 N. Y. Supp. 555 (1922).
8
Brittan v. Oakland Bank, supra note 4; Supply Ditch Co. v. Elliott, IO
Co0. 327, 15 Pac. 691 (1887) ; Culloden Bank v. Bank of Forsyth, supra note
7; Shattuck v. American Cement Co., 205 Pa. 197, 54 Atl. 785 (1903).
9Hammonds v. Hastings, 134 U. S.401, 10 Sup. Ct. 727 (1889) ; Perkins v.
Cowles, 157 Cal. 625, io8 Pac. 711 (igio); Lilley v. Sterling Oil Co., io8
Kan. 686, z97 Pac. 201 (I92I); Schumacher v. Greene Copper Co., 117 Minn.
124, 134 N. W. 5IO (ig92); Knox v. Eden Musee Co., 148 N. Y. 441, 42 N. E.
988 (x896); Walton v. Standard Drilling Co., 43 S. D. 576, 181 N. W. 96
(1921).
" Real Estate Trust Co. v. Bird, 9o Md. 229, 44 Atl. 1048 (1889) ; Schumacher v. Greene Copper Co., Knox v. Eden Musee Co., both supra note 9;
Wood's Appeal, 92 Pa. 379 (188o); 2 CooK, CORPORATIONS (iith ed. 1923)
§ 376 and § 416: "Nearly all of the rules whereby a purchaser of stock is protected against the rights of previous holders grow out of the fact that such
previous holder or holders have enabled persons to sell the stock, and consequently are estopped from claiming that they did not so intend to do." So,
a certificate which is lost or stolen without the fault of the owner does not
thereafter pass to a bona fide purchaser, for there are then no grounds to work
an estoppel against the owner. East Birmingham Land Co. v. Dennis, 85 Ala.
565, 5 So. 317 (1888).
n§§ 5, 6, 7.
' A similar result was reached in Mancini v. Setaro, 69 Cal. App. 748, 232
Pac. 495 (1925) ; Swigart v. Stoops, supra note 4. But a pledgee is only a
bona fide purchaser of the stock when he extends credit at the time of and in
reliance upon the delivery of the certificates, and not when he accepts them as
security for an existent debt. Commercial Nat. Bank v. Shriner, 275 Fed. 12
(C. C. A. 4th, I92i); Heyman v. Hamilton Nat. Bank, 15ITenn. 21, 266 S.
W. 1043 (924).
"Under § Io of the Act, any attempted transfer wtihout delivery of the
certificate operates only as a promise to transfer. State v. Lafayette Bldg.
Assn., 147 La. 526, 85, So. 228 (i92o) ; Hearne v. Gillette, 151 La. 79, 91 So.
634 (1922).
4
" Colton v. Williams, 65 Ill. App. 466 (1896); Richardson v. Emmet, 6i
App. Div. 205, 7o N. Y. Supp. 546 (Igoi), rev'd on other grounds, 170 N. Y.
412, 63 N. E. 440 (19o2) ; Crouse v. Judson, 41 Misc. 338, 84 N. Y. Supp. 755
(1903). But cf. Getchell v. Biddeford Nat. Bank, 94 Me. 452, 47 At. 895
(19oo). In this case the court held that title to the stock remained in the
.husband even though the stock was bought in the wife's name, because the
husband showed an intent to retain title by receiving the dividends and retaining possession of the certificates.
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as the Uniform Stock Transfer Act has also been adopted in Illinois, ' the case
of Chicago Trust Co. v. Ward can only be sustained if the issue of the certificates in the donee's name and notice to her thereof can be construed as constructive delivery to her of the certificates." Such a conclusion based upon these
facts seems unwarranted.
UNFAIR COMPETITION-ENJOINING OF LOTTERY RUN BY COMPETITORS-

Defendants, an association of owners of gasoline and service stations, distributed to their customers who made purchases coupons representing chances in
a drawing held every month. The holder of the winning coupon received an
automobile. Later the coupons were also given out to some who were not
customers. The avowed purpose was to attract business away from competitors who were not members of the association. The plaintiff, an independent
gas station owner, sought to enjoin the coupon plan because it was a lottery
in violation of the state constitution and statutes ' and injured his property
rights in his business and was therefore unfair competition. Held, that the defendants were conducting a lottery and would be enjoined from using such
unfair methods of competition. Featherstone 'v. Independent Service Station
Association, io S. W. (2d) 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
The development of the law of unfair competition parallels the growth of
commerce, and the keen rivalry of modern commercial methods has brought
a great increase in unfair methods of competition.' It has been recognized
for some time that trade-mark infringement, from which the law of unfair
competition originated, is only one species of the genus of unfair competition,3
and that the element of fraud on the public need no longer be present in order
that a business practice be condemned.' There seems to be a growing recognition that any conduct giving a clearly unfair advantage in trade is actionable 3
The instant case represents one phase of this view: no one shall be permitted
to employ criminal means in trade rivalry. The use of lotteries to attract
trade has been frowned upon by the Federal Trade Commnission,0 state legis-

'ILL.

REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1925), c. 32, §§229-253.
"Robert's Appeal, 85 Pa. 84 (1877) is a case very similar to the principal case in facts. A similar result was reached but under the common law.
art. 3, §47; PEN. CODE 1925, art. 654.
'Haines, Efforts to Define Unfair Competition (i919) 29 YALE L. 3. I;
Note (924) 9 ST. Louis L. REV. 294.
'Hanover Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403, 413, 36 Sup. Ct. 357,
'CoNsT.,

360 (1915).

'International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 39 Sup.
Ct. 68 (igi8) ; Carrington, Unfair Competition (921) 7 VA. L. REv. 361, 368.
'Note (1927) 12 CORNELL L. Q. 416, 421. The same tendency is shown
in the wording of Sec. 5 of the FEDERAL TRADE COMmissION ACT, 38 STAT. 719
(I914), i5 U. S. C. §45 (1926), which declares "unfair methods of competition in commerce" to be unlawful, thus leaving the definition of what is unfair
to the Commission and the courts. See dissent of Justice Brandeis in Federal Trade Comm. v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 40 Sup. Ct. 572 (I919).
o I Fed. Trade Commission Dec. 159 (igi8).

RECENT CASES
latures 7 and the courts of at least one state The rule that equity will naot
enjoin the commission of criminal acts will not preclude injunctive relief
against the commission of criminal acts which operate to cause irreparable
injury to property rights In the majority of cases, as in the instant case, the
assertion is made that in an established business, property rights or rights
of a pecuniary nature arise which equity will protect from the injury caused
by the enticing away of customers by illegal means.l The injury must be
alleged' and it must be a particular injury to the plaintiff and not merely an
injury to a class of which the plaintiff is a member. " An examination of the
cases leads to the conclusion that what is being protected is a right to carry
on a business without injury from competitors who resort to criminal conduct, and the inadequacy of the remedy at law is the jurisdictional fact giving
equity the right to act.

See DAVIS, TRUST LAWS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION (I916) 516, n. 5
for a list of states having statutes prohibiting the issue of trading stamps redeemable in articles whose selection is dependent on chance, hazard or contingency.
8
Glover v. Malloska, 238 Mich. 216, 123 N. W. i07 (1927).
In re Debs, i58 U. S. 564, i5 Sup. Ct. goo (1894) ; Coty v. Prestonettes,
285 F. 501 (C. C. A. 2d, i922) rev'd on other grounds, 264 U. S. 359, 44 Sup.
Ct. 350 (1924); Long v. Southern Express Co., 2oi Fed. 441 (S. D. Fla.
1912) re'd on other grounds, 202 Fed. 462 (C. C. A. 5th, 1913); see Milliken v. Stone, I6 F. (2d) 98i (C. C. A. 2d, 1927); Christie St. Comm. Co. v.
Board of Trade, 92 Ill. App. 6o4 (i9oo); N. Y., N H. & H. Ry. v. Deister,
253 Mass. 178, 148 N. E. 590 (1925) ; United Traction Co. v. Smith, 115 Misc.
73, 187 N. Y. Supp. 377 (iga).
"°Bitterman v. Louisville R. Co., 207 U. S. 205, 28 Sup. Ct. 91 (1907);
Coty v. Prestonettes, supra note 9; Long v. Southern Express Co., supra note
9; Nashville Ry. v. McConnel, 82 Fed. 65 (M. D. Tenn. 1897); Renner Brewing Co. v. Rolland, 96 Ohio St. 432, 1i8 N. E. zi8 (1917); Choctaw Pressed
Brick Co. v. Townsend, io8 OkI. 235, 236 Pac. 46 (I925).
'Healy v. Sidone, 127 Atl. 52o (N. J. Eq. 1923).
" Smith v. Lockwood, I3 Barb. 209 (N. Y. 1852); Merz v. Murchison,
ii Ohio C. C. (N. s.) 458 (i9o8).

